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ABSTRACT
Eventual consistency (EC) is a relaxed data consistency model that,
driven by the CAP theorem, trades prompt consistency for high
availability. Although, this model has shown to be promising and
greatly adopted by industry, the state of the art only assumes that
replicas can crash and recover. However, a Byzantine replica (i.e.,
arbitrary or malicious) can hamper the eventual convergence of
replicas to a global consistent state, thus compromising the entire
service. Classical BFT state machine replication protocols cannot
solve this problem due to the blocking nature of consensus, some-
thing at odd with the availability via replica divergence in the EC
model. In this work in progress paper, we introduce a new secure
highly available protocol for the EC model that assumes a frac-
tion of replicas and any client can be Byzantine. To respect the
essence of EC, the protocol gives priority to high availability, and
thus Byzantine detection is performed o the critical path on a con-
sistent data oset. The paper concisely explains the protocol and
discusses its feasibility. We aim at presenting a more comprehensive
and empirical study in the future.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Eventual Consistency (EC) [14] emerged as a relaxed trade-o
model between strong consistency and availability, given that net-
work partitions and high latency links cannot be avoided in geo-
replicated and highly scalable systems [7]. Replicated services that
are built through EC are highly available since client’s requests are
served via a local application server (or replica) without immediate
synchronization with other servers; this step is however performed
in the background to avoid blocking of client requests, but still
ensure (eventual) data convergence. State-of-the-art research in
EC assumes that replicas can crash and recover back to the last
“healthy” state. Unfortunately, there is evidence that malicious and
arbitrary (a.k.a., Byzantine [10]) faults are not rare even in leading
Internet services [12, 13]. In the case of EC, a Byzantine server can
apply operations in an incorrect way (deliberately or not) which
hampers data convergence, and thus compromises the entire service.
Consequently, secure EC solutions that are resilient to Byzantine
faults, being the strongest fault model [4], are highly advocated
when the deployment conditions of servers and clients creates risk
for this class of faults.
Classical BFT protocols like state machine replication proto-
cols [4, 9] cannot simply solve the EC problem due to two main rea-
sons. The rst is that such protocols are often blocking to the clients
since total order coordination is required per operation. The second
reason is that replicas are considered correct (i.e., not Byzantine)
as long as all replies match; i.e., it requires that replies are exactly
equivalent. In a recent work [5], the authors tried to solve the latter
case by allowing a replica to immediately execute a request, with-
out rst establishing a total order, whereas Byzantine agreement
between replicas is used, either periodically or on-demand, to estab-
lish a common state synchronization point as well as to identify the
set of individual operations needed to resolve conicts. Meanwhile,
the client must wait for enough replies from a majority of replicas
(after Byzantine agreement is achieved) to commit a reply, which is
clearly blocking and impose high delays under network partitions
or high latency. Another major issue is that servers may stop re-
ceiving new requests until Byzantine agreement among servers is
achieved to withstand a Byzantine client. Indeed, we believe that
this is impractical in scenarios where eventual consistency was se-
lected to not forfeit availability. Another approach, followed in [12],
PaPoC’17„ April 23 2017, Belgrade, Serbia Ali Shoker, Houssam Yactine, and Carlos Baquero
S1
BFT Proxy
EC
S2
BFT Proxy
EC
S3
BFT Proxy
EC
S4
BFT Proxy
EC
Clients Clients Clients Clients
B3
B2 B4
B1
Loose
Strong
BFT Cluster
Front-end
Back-end
RCB RCB RCB
Figure 1: The systemmodel showing how a consistent oset
is always veried through the BFT cluster (back-end) with-
out hindering clients access to application servers Sj (front-
end) through eventual consistency. Si are loosely coupled via
a Reliable Causal Broadcast (RCB).
was to modify an existing protocol, i.e., Zyzzyva, to support the
EC model. Unfortunately, this is impractical for two reasons: (1) it
adds more complexity to Zyzzyva whose recovery phase is known
to be very complex to implement and test [9], and (2) the industry
is unlikely to completely replace a currently running middleware
with a new (complex) one. Therefore, we believe that a layered
approach that separates EC logic from Byzantine fault tolerance is
more convenient as it does not require much changes in the running
system.
In this paper, we introduce Byzec , a protocol that makes even-
tual consistency “as secure as possible”, without impact on system’s
availability nor requiring a signicant modication to an already
deployed system. The protocol allows the service to run in an
eventually consistent manner whereas Byzantine behaviors are
detected o the critical path, in a back-end process, with the help
of a black-box BFT cluster. In particular, and as described in Fig. 1,
client’s requests are served by an associated application server as
they arrive without immediate synchronization with other servers,
which is done in the background and eventually leading to data
convergence. Decoupled form this front-end logic, a server progres-
sively sends consistent data osets to the BFT cluster to be matched
against similar versions of other servers, thus forming a “certi-
cate”: a signed proof that up to this very oset, data is equivalent
on an appropriate majority of non Byzantine application servers.
The client progressively receives the most recent certicate along
the replies of the associated server. This allows the client to verify
the validity of the certicate; otherwise, it may switch to another
server if it holds a proof (basically an invalid certicate) of detect-
ing a Byzantine server, or if the certicate is not suciently up to
date (which is veried through the other servers as well). This will
ensure that Byzantine clients cannot send false acquisitions against
correct application servers. Note that the application servers layer
is important to prevent direct contact between the clients and the
cluster which ensures convergence despite the presence of Byzan-
tine clients, provided that a maximum of f application servers can
be Byzantine.
One may argue that our solution is not suciently secure as
clients can receive non certied data. While this is true, the client
will be able to progressively detect any misbehaviors once the con-
sistent data oset evolves. In our opinion, adopting more secure
solutions like fault prevention or hiding will impose extra delays as
it is done in the critical path, whereas our solution is accountable
for Byzantine faults without impacting availability. We believe that
in the same sense that the adopters of EC trade strong consistency
— despite being a correctness property — for availability, they will
likely be keen to trade high security in favor of high availability.
What supports our argument is that current EC solutions in pro-
duction still run in the wild without such Byzantine guarantees;
and therefore, they may be less reluctant to adopt secure solutions
like ours provided that availability is not compromised.
The solution we introduce is interesting for both: service and
applications. On the service side, our solution is important as it
guarantees convergence despite the presence of Byzantine servers
or clients (see later), which is not possible in current EC systems.
On the application side, it is interesting due to its exibility through
allowing a spectrum of options: A non sensitive client can proceed
with operations without checking the certicate (i.e., as current
systems do), whereas a very conservative client can only accept
read operations from a certied consistent data (on the expense
of stale data); a trade-o option is to accept a limited number of
operations ahead the certied data as long as they will be veried
in the future and can be rolled back.
We describe a short version of the protocol in the following
sections, leaving the details to a comprehensive study in the future,
accompanied with an empirical evaluation to assess the usefulness
and feasibility of our approach.
2 PROTOCOL
2.1 Background, system model and fault model
We address a system model where application servers are geo-
replicated and (fully) share data structures. A client is directed, via
a load balancer, to a given application server. A client can change
the associated application server through providing an “acceptable”
argument to the load balancer (e.g., the old server is Byzantine). This
is described in the front-end in Fig. 1. To ensure high availability
in face of network partitions, the front-end components follow the
eventual consistency data model: operations of clients are served by
the associated server without prompt synchronization with other
servers, and they are background propagated to other servers via
Reliable Causal Broadcast [2]. Since operations can be applied in dif-
ferent orders on dierent servers, a conict resolution method must
be used. Without loss of generality, a recently well known approach
is to use Conict-free Replicated DataTypes [11] that encapsulate
conict resolution through mathematically sound policies. At any
time, a server can have a dierent data version provided that all
replicas will eventually converge to the same state. Obviously, since
a running system is very unlikely to be idle, convergence will not
be observed immediately; however, a consistent oset of the data
must be ensured once the same set of operations are executed on all
replicas and provided that no concurrent operations are expected.
This notion is similar to causal stability used in [1] and background
global sequence formation in [3], both for non Byzantine settings.
Currently, data convergence is guaranteed as long as replicas
execute the operations correctly, and assuming that a crashed sever
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can recover to the recent correct state [11, 14]. A single Byzantine
server can however prevent convergence since the wrong execu-
tion of a single operation on the Byzantine server may lead to an
inconsistent data state. In this paper, we assume that f application
servers out of 3f + 1 can be Byzantine, and that any client can be
Byzantine. Note that 2f + 1 application servers are not sucient as
in the case of crash-stop fault models1; to achieve liveness in the
Byzantine model, additional f replicas are required since it is impos-
sible to distinguish a Byzantine node from another one that is just
slow [10]. We also assume the presence of a BFT cluster that runs
a classical BFT state-machine protocol like PBFT [4], Zyzzyva [9]
or even an adaptive mix of these protocols as in Adapt [8]. The
purpose is to use this cluster to achieve agreement using strong
consistency methods. The fact that this cluster uses consensus will
have no impact on the availability of the service once used in the
background, as shown in Fig. 1. In particular, we assume that appli-
cation servers can send (through a BFT proxy process) data osets
to the BFT cluster, which ensures the agreement of at least 2f + 1
application servers on the common oset.
Finally, we assume that clients and servers (secretly) exchange
cryptographic keys that cannot be broken. We don’t address ood-
ing attacks, we rather assume the existence of another security layer
to guard against them. In addition, we require that clients (that can
be end users, proxies, or third party servers), have a method to roll-
back data changes that have been recently made. We do not address
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and we treat requests issued by
Byzantine clients as normal requests as long as they are legitimate
(i.e., following the algorithm).
2.2 An overview of Byzec
We present an overview of the protocol and we associate the corre-
sponding pseudo-code in the Appendix 3 for convenience (given
the page limits). The protocol works as follows: a client can access
a single server, chosen through a load balancer, following the EC
model. The normal case message pattern, depicted in Fig. 2a, is the
regular case where no Byzantine behaviors are present. Clients fol-
low this case as long as they receive valid certicates. A certicate
is a hash digest of an incrementally consistent data oset that is
signed by at least f + 1 application servers which guarantees its
correctness and integrity. A non Byzantine application server initi-
ates the preparation of a new certicate once it has a new causally
stable operation: an operation for which concurrent operations are
no longer delivered through the RCB [2]. (This is usually known
once a newer operation, in the causal future, is received from each
server.). Since a stable operation has already been executed on all
servers, the data oset corresponding to all stable operations must
be a consistent oset. This is ensured through preparing a corre-
sponding certicate by the application servers, o the critical path,
with the help of a BFT cluster.
A valid certicate informs the client that the data received cor-
responding to that certied data oset is fault-free; however, no
security guarantees are promised for the operations corresponding
to the non-certied data, in favor of high availability. If the certi-
cate is invalid (Fig. 2b) the client will change the current application
1Read and Write quorums must interest in at least one non faulty server even under
network partitions.
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Figure 2: Messaging patterns of the protocol.
server showing a proof of mis-behavior of the previous server. Once
the client updates its state after communicating with the new server,
it rolls back the non-certied operations and returns to the normal
case.
The remaining case is when the received certicate from a server
is outdated — it has not been updated for a “long” time. This can be
due to two reasons: either the server is Byzantine, or there is some
network partitioning or delays preventing the certicates from
being updated on all servers — because causal stability does not take
place on these conditions and the consistent oset stays the same.
In the latter case, it is enough for the client to receive f +1matching
responses showing that the certicate is up to date; consequently,
the client will have no advantage of changing a server. Notice that
f + 1 matching replies are enough to rule out Byzantine faults and
at the same time tolerate network partitions. To the contrary, if the
certicate is too old according to f + 1 servers which hold a more
up-to-date certicates, these servers add the Byzantine server to the
blacklist and reply back to the client. Once f + 1 matching replies
are received by the client, it becomes eligible to as for changing the
server and continue through the normal case again.
3 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Eventual consistency (EC) is a weak data consistency model that fa-
vors availability over consistency. Although EC is becoming promi-
nent in large deployments [6, 14], data convergence approaches
only address the Crash-Recovery fault model, and thus adequate
support for stronger fault models (like the Byzantine model) is
still missing. Recent works (like [5, 12]) tried to solve the problem,
but the result was at the expense of the most important criteria in
such system which is availability, as it required blocking all clients
during synchronization between replicas.
Byzec , outlined here, is a new protocol that handles this issue
by respecting the essence of EC: the protocol gives priority to high
availability, and thus Byzantine faults detection is performed in
background, o the critical path on a consistent data oset. Given
that design, Byzec can be used as an added value for practical EC
based systems, increase security and fault-tolerance without aect-
ing performance. We are currently implementing the protocol to
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assess its behavior and performance. We plan to drive an empiri-
cal study to compare Byzec with classical BFT models as well as
existing optimistic BFT models.
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A THE PSEUDOCODE OF BYZEC
We provide the pseudocode of Byzec for the client, application
server, and BFT cluster in Algorithm 2, 31, and 4, respectively. The
algorithms make use of some abstractions, dened in Def. 10, which
we avoid to include in the pseudocode as they are self-explanatory,
and to keep the description concise and clear.
A.1 The client protocol
On start, a client chooses an application server s through any load
balancing approach. When a user invokes a new operation o, the
client sends a REQUEST to the associated application server (Al-
gorithm. 2, lines 10-13), where NReq is the last sequential client’s
request number, ci is the client identier and 〈〉αci is the encrypted
security token (e.g. digital signature and hash digest) signed with
the private key α if the client.
When a client receives a RESPONSE from the associated server
(Algorithm. 2, lines 14-26), where m is the received message and
σ ′ is the last received certicate, it checks its validity (i.e., authen-
tication, integrity, and sequence number): if it received a number
of invalid messages (dened in a policy), it simply changes the
application server through the load balancer (Algorithm .2, lines
15-20). However, if the message holds an invalid certicate, the
client sends a COMPLAIN message to all other application servers.
Otherwise, the client processes the received message.
When a client receives f + 1 matching and valid BLACKLIST
messages as a response to its COMPLAIN request (Algorithm. 2,
lines 27-36), it updates its blacklist accordingly, requests a new
server (if its associated server is blacklisted), and resumes sending
REQUEST in the normal case.
A.2 The server protocol
On receiving a valid client’s REQUEST (Algorithm. 3, lines 10-17),
the associated application server checks the received message’s
validity. According to the retransmission policy, the server resends
a stored RESPONSE message if it was executed earlier; otherwise,
it processes the new operation and sends a RESPONSE to the client
with its last certicate. On the other hand, when the server re-
ceives a COMPLAIN from a client (Algorithm. 3, lines 18-22) due
to detecting an old certicate, the server checks for message’s va-
lidity (mainly the signatures in the old certicate and the corre-
spoding server) to make sure that the client is not lying. If the
message is invalid, the server drops it; otherwise, it updates the list
of Byzantine servers by adding the outdated received certicate to
the BLACKLIST, broadcasts it to other servers, and sends it back to
the client.
When an application server reaches stability at time τ (Algorithm.
3, lines 24-25), it generates a digest for a consistent oset including
causally stable operations and sends a STABLE message to the
BFT cluster, asking for new certicate synchronization with other
servers. Once the new certicate σ ′ is received (Algorithm. 3, lines
26-31), the application server checks if the received certicate is
valid and updates its old certicate σ with a new one σ ′.
A.3 The BFT cluster protocol
When the BFT cluster receives a digest of a consistent oset STABLE
from a (non Byzantine) server (Algorithm. 4, lines 1-7), the BFT clus-
ter checks the received message’s validity and drops the message if
it is invalid. Otherwise, it tries to match at least 2f + 1 messages
with same new updated certicate to broadcast it to all servers. The
BFT cluster algorithm we provide excludes the encapsulated BFT
state-machine protocol that is used as a black box.
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Denitions 1: Auxiliary abstractions.
1 loadBalance() : chooses a server through load balancing.
2 validMsg(): encapsulates authentication, integrity, and sequence nb of
a messages.
3 validCertificate(): checks if certicate is signed by f + 1 servers.
4 validPolicy(): a retransmission policy followed by clients and servers.
5 outdatedCertificate(): a certiccate has not been updated for a long
time according to a certain policy.
6 rollback(): rolls back requests issued after last correct certicate.
7 matching() : checks if messages are matching.
8 stable(): returns a timestamp that has become causally stable.
9 stableOset() : returns a datatype oset corresponding to a stable
timestamp.
10 bAgree(): returns a certicate signed by all BFT agreed servers on a
stable timestamp and corresponding digest.
Algorithm 2: The client protocol.
1 init:
2 s := loadBalance(S )
3 NReq := 0
4 NComplain := 0
5 lastReq := ϕ
6 BList := ϕ
7 Buered := ϕ
8 σ := ϕ
9 data := ϕ
10 on invokedi (OPERATION, o):
11 NReq := NReq + 1
12 lastReq := (NReq, o, ci )
13 send(REQUEST, 〈lastReq〉αci , s )
14 on receivei (RESPONSE, in = 〈m, σ ′〉αs ):
15 if ¬ validMsg(in, s ) ∨
16 ¬ validCertificate(σ ′) then
17 if ¬ validPolicy() then
18 s := loadBalance(S )
19 data := rollback(data, σ );
20 send(REQUEST, 〈lastReq〉αci , s )
21 else
22 if outdatedCertificate(σ ′) then
23 NComplain := NComplain + 1
24 send(COMPLAIN, 〈NComplain, in〉αci , S )
25 else
26 process(m)
27 on receivei (BLACKLIST, in = 〈bList, σ 〉αsj ):
28 if ¬ validMsg(in, sj ) then
29 dropMsg(〈bList, σ 〉αsj )
30 else
31 add(Buered, bList )
32 if matching(Buered) > f then
33 BList := bList
34 if s ∈ BList then
35 s := loadBalance(S )
36 send(REQUEST, 〈lastReq〉αci , s )
Algorithm 3: The server protocol.
1 Init:
2 data := ϕ
3 ∀i ∈ I, LastRes[i] = 0
4 ∀i ∈ I, NReq[i] = 0
5 σ := ϕ
6 BList := ϕ
7 timestamp := (0, 0 . . . )
8 seq := 0
9 With Clients:
10 on receivej (REQUEST, in = 〈m〉αci ):
11 if ¬ validMsg(in, ci ) then
12 if validPolicy() then
13 send(RESPONSE, 〈LastRes[i], σ 〉αsj , ci )
14 else
15 dropMsg(in)
16 else
17 LastRes[i] := process(m, data, timestamp)
NReq[i] := NReq[i] + 1
send(RESPONSE, 〈LastRes[, ]σ 〉αsj , ci )
18 on receivej (COMPLAIN, in = 〈〈m, σ 〉αs 〉αci ):
19 if ¬ validMsg(in, ci ) then
20 dropMsg(in)
21 else
22 add(BList, outdatedCertificate(〈m, σ 〉αs , s ))
send(BLACKLIST, 〈BList, σ 〉αsj , ci )
23 With BFT Cluster:
24 on stablej (τ ):
25 consistentOset := stableOset(data, τ )
D := Digest(consistentOset)
send(STABLE, 〈D, τ , seq〉αsj , BFTCluster)
26 on receivej (CERTIFICATE, in = 〈σ ′, seq〉αb ):
27 if ¬ validMsg(in, b ) then
28 dropMsg(in)
29 else
30 if validCertificate(σ ′, seq, seq) then
31 σ := σ ′
Algorithm 4: The BFT cluster protocol.
1 With BFT Cluster:
2 on receivej (STABLE, in = 〈D, stableT S, seq〉αsj ):
3 if ¬ validMsg(in, sj ) ∨ then
4 dropMsg(in)
5 else
6 (cer t, Servers ) := bAgree(D, stableT S, seq )
7 if | Servers | ≥ 2f + 1 then
8 send(CERTIFICATE, 〈cer t, seq〉αb , Servers )
